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By asking questions, an agent can modify the range of options from which a decision is made.[12] introduced
a logic for reasoning about this role of question-asking in the decision-making process. The base logic is
a modal logic with an operator D interpreted by: Dϕ iﬀ after any rational choice that the agent can
make, ϕ holds. On top of this, we proposed an analysis of questions as dynamic operators [?Q] and [!Q]
which alter the range of options available to the agent in various ways. In the present paper, we provide a
complete axiomatisation for this dynamic logic, and extend the analysis to complex questions. A particular
feature of our approach is that it does not assume that an agent’s preferences are transitive. Here we give a
characterisation of the transitivity of the preference order in terms of invariance under changes of the order
in which questions are asked. This is applied to a notorious case of transitivity failure: Condorcet’s voting
paradox.
Keywords: rational choice, preference, closed and open questions, hybrid logic, transitivity of preferences,
Condorcet, dynamic logic
1 Questions in decision-making
To decide is to choose between a number of options. The range of options available
is to some extent determined by contextual factors beyond the control of the agent
who makes the decision. But it is also determined in part by the agent’s cognitive
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state. In particular, the agent must know which options are available to her. In this
paper, we will focus on exchange decisions, in which an agent has made a particular
decision and then considers changing her mind as the result of new information.
The new information will come from asking certain questions about the alternatives
available. For example, suppose you have been walking to work every day along
the south side of the river. Today, however, you wonder whether there is a better
way to go, and consider whether crossing the bridge and walking along the north
side would be better. In other words, you ask a question about whether taking the
north or south side of the river makes any diﬀerence. This kind of ‘open’ question
is typical in decision-making. One uses such questions to broaden the space of
alternatives and so increase ones chances of arriving at an optimal decision. Of
course, the trade-oﬀ is that consideration of more alternatives carries costs in time,
cognitive processing, and other costs associated with information-gathering. (One
might have to buy a map!)
In [12], we introduced a logic for reasoning about the role of question-asking
in the decision-making process. The logic was motivated by the analysis of the
following example, which we repeat here, in order to explain our application of the
logic.
Alice is considering moving house. She is unhappy with the fact that her house
is far from the bus stop. She searches the listings for a house that is better
located and sees several that she likes better. She goes to visit the one of them
with Betty, her good friend. When Betty sees the house, she says ‘what about a
garden?’ This is not a question that Alice had considered before. Her own house
doesn’t have one, but she is inﬂuenced by Betty to go back to the listings and
check out houses with gardens. Eventually, she ﬁnds a house and moves. It has a
nice big garden. But a few months later, she visits Chandra, a friend of Betty’s
who lives in a concrete house. Alice ﬁnds it quite charming. Her new house is
timber-framed, like her old house and every house she has ever lived in. That
night, she goes back to the listings. Alice is so impressed with the houses she
looks at. Why had she never thought of houses being made out of anything but
wood? Next month, she has moved into her new plaster house, which looks very
modern and stylish. But after a while she happens to walk past her old house -
the ﬁrst one. Taken by it’s quaint charm and worn woodwork, she realises that
she prefers it to her new house.
The story illustrates how the process of practical decision-making is guided by
the questions one asks. Alice may well have asked very direct questions, such as
‘does it have a roof?’ and ‘can I aﬀord it?’ but often it is the more open ended
questions such as ‘what about a garden?’ that helped her to enlarge the options
available to her, and it is these questions that we will focus on. Eventually, it is
clear that something has clearly gone wrong with Alice’s decision-making. In the
excitement of the search, something was missing. An easy answer is that Alice’s
preferences are clearly not transitive. She is therefore irrational, in some sense. But
the apparent plausibility of each of her decisions suggests there is more to be said.
An example of a similar kind, not considered in [12], involves majority voting,
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which notoriously fails in general to preserve the transitivity of preferences. This
can produce some odd results. Consider the following example.
Three friends are going out together for the evening and need to pick a designated
driver. First they assume that Andrew will drive, but he objects and suggest
Barry instead. They agree that Andrew will drive unless the majority prefer that
Barry drives. But they vote for Barry to drive. This time Barry objects because
Charles has not even been considered. They decide that Barry should drive unless
the majority prefer that Charles drives, in which case Charles is picked as the
driver. This happens and Charles is selected, despite the fact that the majority
prefer Andrew (the original choice) as the designated driver.
This is a version of Condorcet’s Paradox. 4 Assuming that no one prefers himself
to be the driver, the preferences of the three friends must have been as follows:
A < B B < C A < C
Andrew yes yes yes A < B < C
Barry no yes no B < C < A
Charles yes no no C < A < B
Majority yes yes no
The propositional variables A, B and C stand for ‘Andrew drives’, ‘Barry drives,’
and ‘Charles drives,’ respectively. The preference ordering for the majority is A <
B < C < A which is clearly intransitive. We can model this in the manner shown




Fig. 1. Condorcet drivers
questions? Initially, Andrew is presumed to be the driver, then he asks ‘what
about Barry?’ At this point the dashed line dividing A and B fades to reveal B as
the preferred driver. They ask whether it will be Andrew or Barry, and the vote
4 This is the problem with majority voting observed by the Marquis de Condorcet in the late 18th century,
which shows how three or more agents voting on an issue with more than two options are not guaranteed
to produce a transitive preference order.
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determines it to be Barry. This decision re-establishes our line between A and B.
But then Barry asks ‘what about Charles?’ The line between B and C now fades,
with the result that Charles is selected. We will describe the various operations on
the model brought about by the questions asked.
2 A dynamic logic of preferential choice: the atomic
case
[12] introduces a logic for reasoning about decision-making when the agent’s prefer-
ences may fail to be transitive. We suppose that every decision is made in a context
in which some factors are allowed to vary and others remain constant. In other
words, we follow von Wright [11] and others (especially Girard, in [6]) in taking
judgements based on preference to be ceteris paribus. Recent work on the logic
of ceteris paribus operators ([9] and [7]) provided a technical approach that was
adapted in [12], with some changes. Speciﬁcally, we take an atomic ceteris paribus
choice model M = 〈F, V, P 〉 to consist of a choice model 〈F, V 〉 together with a
set P of propositional variables, which we interpret as the atomic facts that are
held constant ceteris paribus. This means that the range of options available to the
agent consists of those within the equivalence class of the present situation, where
‘equivalence’ is deﬁned by
u ≈ v iﬀ for each p ∈ P , u ∈ V (p) iﬀ v ∈ V (p)
We require P to be coﬁnite, so that only a ﬁnite number of propositional variables
are allowed to vary.
These structures are described by the language
i | p | ¬ | ∧ |  | D | U
where i ∈ Nom, a set of nominals, p ∈ Prop, a set of propositional variables and
, D, and U are unary modal operators. The nominals are included in the language
so that we can reason about particular agent’s preferences concerning particular
states/entities. We abbreviate ♦ = ¬¬, 〈D〉 = ¬D¬ and E = ¬U¬ to get the
corresponding existential modalities. The semantic conditions for our language must
be restricted to observe the restriction to ≈:
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M,w |= p iﬀ w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= i iﬀ w ∈ V (i)
M,w |= ¬ϕ iﬀ M,w |= ϕ
M,w |= (ϕ ∧ ψ) iﬀ M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= ϕ iﬀ M, v |= ϕ for each v ≈ w such that w ≤ v
M,w |= Uϕ iﬀ M, v |= ϕ for each v ≈ w
M,w |= Dϕ iﬀ M, v |= ϕ for each v ≈ w such that v is also ≤ ∩ ≈-maximal
To say that a state u is ‘≤ ∩ ≈-maximal’ means that any other state v within
the ≈-equivalence class of u that is at least as good as u (u ≤ v) is also no better
than u, (v ≤ u). This is our analysis of the condition under which it is rational to
choose u ceteris paribus. 5 Note, in particular, that we do not require the ≤ relation
to be transitive. The ‘universal’ modality U is also restricted ceteris paribus. The
following axiomatization is proved complete in [12]:
Theorem 2.1 The set of formulas valid over the class of atomic ceteris paribus
preference models is axiomatized by basic hybrid logic, H, together with
Universal Equivalence i → Ei
i → UEi
EEi → Ei
Reﬂexivity i → ♦i
Inclusion ♦i → Ei
Preferential Choice 〈D〉i ↔ E(i ∧♦i)
Call this the logic PC of Preferential Choice.
To this base, we add some dynamic operators. We model the eﬀect of asking the
open question ‘what about p?’ as the operation of changing the modelM = 〈F, V, P 〉
to the model [?p]M = 〈F, V, P \{p}〉 in which p has been subtracted from the set of
propositional variables that must be held constant when we search for alternatives.
Or, in other words, the range of alternative from which the agent may choose has
expanded to include those that diﬀer with respect to the value for p. More generally,
for a ﬁnite set Q of propositional variables, we deﬁne
[?Q]M = 〈F, V, P \Q〉
This operation on models is expressed by the operator [?Q] with
M,w |= [?Q]ϕ iﬀ [?Q]M,w |= ϕ
This enables us to give the following analysis of Alice’s decision-making (repeated
from [12]). Consider the representation of Alice’s preferences shown in Figure 2.
We model M Alice’s decisions about moving from house 0 using the frame shown,
5 [12] has more discussion of the adequacy of this account.








Fig. 2. Alice’s story
F , with nominals for each of the houses. t, g, p are propositional variables. Initially,
before Alice considers moving, all of these are ﬁxed, so we take P = Prop. When
Alice is unhappy about living far from the bus stop, she searches for houses and
considers 1, 2, and 3. These options are available because she has asked the question
[?p]. She rejects 1 and we have M, 0 |= [?p]D(2∨3) She decides to move to house 2,
but her friend Betty asks ‘what about a garden?’ [?g]. Then the listings for houses
is enlarged and since M, 2 |= [?p][?g]D6 she moves to house 6. We’ll return to the
example when we can say more about what happens next.
3 A ﬂexible fragment of Ceteris Paribus Logic
There is a systematic relationship between the current approach and the Ceteris
Paribus Logic of [9] and [7], which uses the language Lcp deﬁned by
p | ¬ | ∧ | 〈Γ〉
where Γ is a set of formulas of Lcp.
6 Interpreted in a preference model M , the
semantic condition for 〈Γ〉 is
M,w |= 〈Γ〉ϕ iﬀ M, v |= ϕ for all v ≥ w and for all ψ ∈ Γ
M,w |= ψ iﬀ M, v |= ψ
The axiomatisation of the set of validities of Lcp is still an open problem but it is
solved in the case of the ‘ﬂexible fragment’. Details of this fragment are given in
[7]. It is enough for our purposes to note that ϕ is ﬂexible if every modal operator
in ϕ is of the form 〈Γ〉 where Γ is a coﬁnite set of propositional variables. Call these
the coﬁnite formulas. But now if we consider the atomic ceteris paribus preference
model M ′ = 〈F, V, P 〉 then
6 This circular deﬁnition can be straightened out with a transﬁnite recursive deﬁnition. Lcp is a proper
class but this does not cause a problem in practice. See [7] for details.
Z. Xiong, J. Seligman / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 278 (2011) 261–274266
M ′, w |= [?Q]♦ϕ iﬀ M,w |= 〈P \Q〉ϕ
and since Q is ﬁnite and P is coﬁnite, P \Q is also coﬁnite. This connection between
the two languages inspires consideration of the following axioms for our dynamic
operators:
Question Distribution  [?Q]p ↔ p
 [?Q]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[?Q]ϕ
 [?Q](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ([?Q]ϕ ∧ [?Q]ψ)
 [?Q1][?Q2]ϕ ↔ [?Q1 ∪Q2]ϕ
Applying these axioms from left to right to push question operators to minimal
scope, it is easy to see that the ♦-fragment of our language is logically equivalent
to the coﬁnite fragment of Lcp.
7 This is enough to establish the axiomatisability of
the ♦-fragment. To go further in this direction, we would have to extend ﬂexible
Lcp to a multi-modal setting, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we
will formulate axioms for atomic ceteris paribus preference logic directly, using the
methods employed for ﬂexible Lcp.
The main idea is to reduce all question operators occurring in a formula to
multiple occurrences of a single question operator. This can be done using the
following valid equivalences:
Question Expansion
 [?Q]♦ϕ ↔ (p ∧ [?p,Q]♦(p ∧ ϕ)) ∨ (¬p ∧ [?p,Q]♦(¬p ∧ ϕ))
 [?Q]Eϕ ↔ (p ∧ [?p,Q]E(p ∧ ϕ)) ∨ (¬p ∧ [?p,Q]E(¬p ∧ ϕ))
 [?Q]Dϕ ↔ (p ∧ [?p,Q]D(p ∧ ϕ)) ∨ (¬p ∧ [?p,Q]D(¬p ∧ ϕ))
Now for any formula ϕ, let
Qϕ =
⋃
{Q | [?Q] occurs in ϕ}
In other words, Qϕ is the set of all propositional variables questioned in ϕ. By
repeated application of Question Distribution and Question Expansion from left to
right, we can compute a logically equivalent formula ϕ′ in which the only question
operator that occurs is [?Qϕ]. But now we can apply Question Distribution from
right to left to ﬁnd a logically formula of the form [?Qϕ]ϕ
′′ where ϕ′′ contains no
question operators. But
〈F, V, P 〉, w |= [?Qϕ]ϕ′′ iﬀ 〈F, V, P \Qϕ〉, w |= ϕ′′
This suggest a ﬁnal rule of inference for questions:
7 The axioms allow us to show that any formula in the ♦-fragment is equivalent to one in which the only
occurrences of questions are immediately in front of modal operators, and these can be translated into Lcp
operators. In the reverse directly, when Γ is conﬁnite, Prop \ Γ is ﬁnite and so we have that [?Prop \ Γ]♦ is
equivalent to 〈Γ〉.
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Question Generalisation if  ϕ then  [?Q]ϕ
which the above shows to be sound. Thus, if ϕ is consistent, so is [?Qϕ]ϕ
′′, and so
is ϕ′′, which contains no question operators and so is satisﬁable by Theorem 2.1.
This establishes
Theorem 3.1 The set of valid formulas of the language of ceteris paribus prefer-
ence logic with atomic question operators is axiomatised by PC plus Question Distribution.
Question Expansion and Question Generalisation. Call this the logic aQPC.
Now this is the logic for arbitrary (atomic) ceteris paribus frames, but it is also
interesting to see how the transitive frames can be axiomatised. It is, of course, well
known that this can be done with ♦♦i → ♦i. But, more interestingly, it can also
be done with the following principle:
Question Permutation [?p]♦[?q]♦i ↔ [?q]♦[?p]♦i
This says that the order of asking questions in a sequence of choices is irrelevant.
Our examples of Alice and the Condorcet drivers both depend on this not being
valid, and we have seen how they suﬀer as a result.
Theorem 3.2 Question Permutation is valid on a ceteris paribus choice frame iﬀ
it is transitive.
Proof. Suppose [?p]♦[?q]♦i ↔ [?q]♦[?p]♦i is valid on F , which is not transitive.
Then F must contain three states 1, 2 and 3 such that 1 ≤ 2 ≤ 3 but 1 ≤ 3. Then







Then M, 1 |= [?p]♦[?q]♦i but M, 1 |= [?q]♦[?p]♦i.
Conversely, suppose for contradiction that [?p]♦[?q]♦i ↔ [?q]♦[?p]♦i is invalid
on a transitive frame F . Without loss of generality, assume there is a model
M = 〈F, V, {p, q}〉 such that M,w |= [?p]♦[?q]♦i and M,w |= [?q]♦[?p]♦i. So
〈F, V, {q}〉, w |= ♦[?q]♦i and so there is a v ≈{q} w such that w ≤ v and 〈F, V, {q}〉, v |=
[?q]♦i. So again there is a u ≈∅ v such that v ≤ u and 〈F, V, ∅〉, u |= i.
Now by transitivity, w ≤ u. And as we know w ≈{q} v, v ≈∅ u, and ≈{q}⊆≈∅.
So w ≈∅ u. Then we have 〈F, V, ∅〉, w |= ♦i and 〈F, V, {p}〉, w |= [?p]♦i. From
w ≤ w, and w ≈ w, 〈F, V, {p}〉, w |= ♦[?p]♦i holds and so M,w |= [?q]♦[?p]♦i holds,
contradicting our assumption. 
4 Open, closed and compound questions
We have interpreted the question ‘what about p?’ as an open question, inviting
not an answer but a further investigation of situations in which p may or may not
be the case. But one can also interpret the question in a closed way, as a request
for an answer. Closure is achieved by ﬁnding out whether p is the case and then
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sticking to the answer. We can easily add an operation [!p] (more generally [!Q])
to our language that has this eﬀect. Let Lc be the extension of L to include closed
question operators. Given a model M = 〈F, V, P 〉, let
[!Q]M = 〈F, V, P ∪Q〉
and deﬁne 8
M,u |= [!Q]ϕ iﬀ [!Q]M,u |= ϕ
Closed questions allow us to give a model of decisions that are actually taken. If
we ask about Q and make a decisive choice, the options opened by [?Q] are typically
closed. We represent this by
[?Q]D[!Q]
The closing of the question marks the end of the decision-making process. This is
no clearer than with examples in which the decision involves a clear action, such as
moving house. 9 Alice deciding to move to a house with a garden and then actually
moving is represented as
[?g]D[!g]
After this point, she no longer considers houses without a garden. If Alice kept
the garden question open, she would not have moved the second time (move to the
house 8), which would have not been a stable option. That is
M, 0 |= [?p]〈D〉[?g]〈D〉[!g][?t]〈D〉8 but not M, 0 |= [?p]〈D〉[?g]〈D〉[?t]〈D〉8
Finally, we can model the last part of Alice’s story, when she discovers that she
prefers her old house 0 to the new one 8. That is
M, 0 |= [?p]〈D〉[?g]〈D〉[!g][?t][〈D〉[?g][!p]D0
As for open questions, closed questions satisfy distribution principles that allow
us to ﬁnd a logical equivalent of any formula in which the only occurrences of [!Q]
are immediately before a modal operator: 10
Closed Question Distribution  [!Q]p ↔ p
 [!Q]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[!Q]ϕ
 [!Q](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ([!Q]ϕ ∧ [!Q]ψ)
 [!Q1][!Q2]ϕ ↔ [!Q1 ∪Q2]ϕ
 [!Q1][?Q2]ϕ ↔ [?Q2 \Q1][!Q1 \Q2]ϕ
Form this point, closed questions are even easier to axiomatize that open questions,
because they satisfy the following reduction axioms, that allow us to remove all
closed questions from the formula:
8 Note that if P is coﬁnite and Q is ﬁnite then P ∪Q is also coﬁnite.
9 The following analysis of the continuation of Alice’s story is also repeated from [12].
10The last of these is valid because (P ∪Q1) \Q2 = (P \ (Q2 \Q1)) ∪ (Q1 \Q2).
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Closed Question Reduction
 [!p,Q]♦ϕ ↔ (p ∧ [!Q]♦(p ∧ ϕ)) ∨ (¬p ∧ [!Q]♦(¬p ∧ ϕ))
 [!p,Q]Eϕ ↔ (p ∧ [!Q]E(p ∧ ϕ)) ∨ (¬p ∧ [!Q]E(¬p ∧ ϕ))
 [!p,Q]Dϕ ↔ (p ∧ [!Q]D(p ∧ ϕ)) ∨ (¬p ∧ [!Q]D(¬p ∧ ϕ))
The parallel with Ceteris Paribus logic continues, as the closed question fragment
of our logic is equivalent to the ﬁnite fragment of Lcp, which was axiomatised in a
similar way in [9].
Theorem 4.1 aQPC together with the axioms of Closed Question Distribution and
Closed Question Reduction is a complete axiomatisation of the set of valid formulas
of Lc.
Extending our language to compound questions is a little more diﬃcult. To
ask the open question ‘what about p?’ when P is the set of variables being held
constant has a clear interpretation, as we have seen. It means simply that we allow
p to vary while keeping everything else in P constant. Compound open questions
present more of a problem. If we ask ‘what about (p∨q)?’ then again, we would like
to allow the truth value of (p ∨ q) to vary while keeping everything else constant.
But in this case, it is diﬃcult to see what ‘everything else’ means. p can be kept
constant while (p ∨ q) varies, and so can q, but if both are held constant, (p ∨ q)
will also be constant. An initial reaction to this problem is to suppose that to allow
(p∨ q) to vary is just to allow both p and q to vary. In that case [?(p∨ q)] would be
equivalent to [?p, q]. More generally, we might say that to allow ϕ to vary (for some
purely Boolean formula ϕ) is to allow Q to vary, where Q is the set of propositional
variables contained in ϕ.
This is not such a bad solution, but it has some limitations. Firstly, taking
the set of propositional variables that occur in ϕ is too crude. The truth-value of
((p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q)) for example, is not at all eﬀected by the truth-value of q, and
so allowing it to vary only requires that p be allowed to vary. Secondly, there is a
non-trivial interaction with closed questions. Suppose we asked the closed question
[!(p ∧ q)]. The result should be that the truth value of (p ∧ q) is kept constant. A
parallel argument to the one above would suggest taking [!(p ∧ q)] = [!p, q]. But
now if we ask the open question [?(p ∨ q)] we would like to allow the truth-value of
(p ∨ q) to vary while keeping that of (p ∧ q) constant. But if [?(p ∨ q)] = [?p, q] and
[!(p ∧ q)] = [!p, q] then [!(p ∧ q)][?(p ∨ q)] = [!p, q][?p, q] = [?p, q], and so we lose the
requirement that (p ∧ q) is held constant.
So, let us ﬁrst extend our language to the language LQ:
i | p | ¬ | ∧ |  | U | [?Q]ϕ | [!Q]ϕ
where Q is a ﬁnite subset of L. 11 A ceteris paribus question model M = 〈F, V,Γ〉
consists of a preference model 〈F, V 〉 and a set Γ of L-formulas. We deﬁne the
11Questions that contain statements about questions are beyond the scope of this paper!
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ceteris paribus relation in the same way as in Lcp, namely
u ≈ v iﬀ for each ϕ ∈ Γ, M,u |= ϕ iﬀ M, v |= ϕ
That is to say, states u and v are equivalent ceteris paribus iﬀ they have the same
value for all formulas in Γ.
To progress further, we will need say more about how holding some formulas
constant eﬀects the value of other formulas. 12 A state description of given a ﬁnite
set of formulas {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} is a formula of the form ±ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ±ϕn where ±ϕi
is either ϕi or ¬ϕi. A set of formulas Γ determines formula ϕ iﬀ it contains a non-
empty ﬁnite subset Γ0 such that for every state description σ of Γ0, either (σ → ϕ)
or (σ → ¬ϕ) is a theorem of PC. 13 Γ determines a set Q of formulas iﬀ it determines
each formula in Q.
Lemma 4.2 If Γ determines Q then in any model M and states u, v, if u ≈ v then
for all ϕ ∈ Q, M,u |= ϕ iﬀ M, v |= ϕ
Proof. Suppose u ≈ v in M and Γ determines Q. Then there is a ﬁnite set
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ Γ that determines Q. So deﬁne
σ = (±ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ±ϕn)
where ±ϕi is ϕ1 if M,u |= ϕi and is ¬ϕ1 if M,u |= ϕi. Then M,u |= σ. Now let
ϕ ∈ Q. Then either (σ → Q) or (σ → ¬Q) is a theorem of PC. Without loss of
generality, suppose (σ → Q) is the theorem. Then M,u |= ϕ. But u ≈ v and each
ϕi ∈ Γ, so M,u |= ϕi iﬀ M, v |= ϕi, and so M, v |= σ and M, v |= ϕ. 
For example, the set {p, q} clearly determines (p∨q) but {(p∧q), p} does not. To
see this, (p∧ q) is clearly not determined by {(p∧ q)} or by {p} and for {(p∧ q), p},
note that ¬(p ∧ q) ∧ ¬p implies neither (p ∨ q) nor ¬(p ∨ q).
Now, say that a subset Γ′ ⊆ Γ is Q-releasing iﬀ Γ′ is a maximally non-Q-
determining subset of Γ, i.e., Γ′ does not determine Q and for any Γ′′ that also does
not determine Q, if Γ′ ⊆ Γ′′ ⊆ Γ then Γ′′ = Γ′.
If P is the set of propositional variables occurring in some Boolean formula ϕ,
then Prop \ P does not determine ϕ. But it may not be ϕ-releasing. For example,
if ϕ is the formula ((p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q)) that we considered earlier, then Prop \ {p, q}
is not ϕ-releasing, because the larger set Prop \ {p} also fails to determine ϕ.
Moreover, a set Γ of formulas may have more than one ϕ-releasing subset. For
example, take Γ = {(p ∧ q), p, q} and ϕ = (p ∨ q). Then both {(p ∧ q), p} and
{(p ∧ q), q} are ϕ-releasing subsets of Γ.
The concept of Q-releasing is exactly what we need to deﬁne the semantics of
open compound questions. Given such a question [?Q] deﬁne the following relation
between models M = 〈F, V,Γ〉 and M = 〈F, V,Γ′〉:
M [?Q]M ′ iﬀ Γ′ is a Q-releasing subset of Γ (in M)
12The problem is similar to the problem of contraction in belief revision.
13One could extend the concept of determination using stronger logics, of course, but PC is suﬃcient for
present purposes.
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Then we use this relation between models to give the semantics for [?Q].
M,u |= [?Q]ϕ iﬀ M ′, u |= ϕ for every M [?Q]M ′
The new language is a conservative extension of the old in the following sense:
Lemma 4.3 If M = 〈F, V, P 〉 is an atomic ceteris paribus question preference
model then it is also a ceteris paribus question model and for any formula ϕ of L,
M,u |= ϕ (as an atomic model) iﬀ M,u |= ϕ (as a general model)
Proof. We need only observe that if Q is a set propositional variables, then P ′ is
a Q-releasing subset of P iﬀ P ′ = P \Q. 
The logical behaviour of the operator [?Q] for non-atomic Q is, however, quite
diﬀerent. In particular, when Q is atomic, [?Q] is self-dual: [?Q] is logically equiv-
alent to ¬[?Q]¬. But does not hold for non-atomic Q. We therefore write 〈?Q〉 for
the dual ¬[?Q]¬.
In the ceteris paribus question preference model M = 〈F, V, {(p ∧ q), p, q}〉, the
relation ≈M is the identity relation because all three states diﬀer on the values
given to either p or q. Now we have seen that {(p∧q),p,q} has two (p∨ q)-releasing
subsets, {(p ∧ q), p} and {(p ∧ q), q}, so
M [?(p ∨ q)]Mq and M [?(p ∨ q)]Mp
where Mq = 〈F, V, {(p∧q), p}〉 and Mp = 〈F, V, {(p∧q), q}〉. And the ceteris paribus
relations in Mp and Mq diﬀer.
These formal properties of our models capture a common insight. When asking
an open question, there is more than one way to proceed, depending on which ceteris
paribus assumptions are dropped. For closed questions, the extension to compound
formulas is much easier. We simply deﬁne
〈F, V,Γ〉, u |= [!Q]ϕ iﬀ 〈F, V,Γ ∪Q〉, u |= ϕ
Now, let’s go back to the Condorcet Drivers Problem. At the beginning the
friends assume that Andrew will drive, and so the equivalence classes determined
by the initial Γ are as shown by the dashed lines of Figure 1. We’ll suppose that
Γ = {A,B,C}. When Andrew asks ‘what about Barry?’ he is opening the question
[?(A ∨B)]. This ensures that the friends will prefer Barry:
M, 0 |= [?(A ∨B)]DB
They vote decisively for Barry, who is selected. This is a decision so the original
question is closed [!(A∨B)]. Later, after a voting about (B∨C), Charles is selected,
because
M, 0 |= [?(A ∨B)]D[!(A ∨B)][?(B ∨ C)]DC
despite the fact that they prefer A to C. We could even go further, adding a new
open question [?(A ∨ C)] to ask about this, with the result that
M, 0 |= [?(A ∨B)]D[!(A ∨B)][?(B ∨ C)]D[!(B ∨ C)][?(A ∨ C)]DA
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5 Closing Remarks and Related Work
The work begun in [12] considers one way in which questions are in involved in
decision-making, namely, the control of the range of options being considered. We
analyse this eﬀect by taking questions to be dynamic operators that alter the range
of ceteris paribus conditions restricting the preference relation, so combining ideas
from preference logic and the logic of questions, but in a way that has not been
considered before. 14 There is now a growing literature on the logic of questions,
some of which also uses dynamic model logic. Johan van Benthem and S¸tefan
Minica˘’s [2] is the central reference. This was adapted in [3] by one of the present
authors to address examples similar to the ones considered here. Nonetheless, the
particular approach adopted in [12] and developed here is novel in addressing the
interaction between question-asking and ceteris paribus conditions. We believe that
this is an important conceptual connection that underlies the role of questions in
inquiry, more generally. A natural direction to take this would be to look at the
role of questions in directing scientiﬁc research. Experimental generalisations are
always expressed as ceteris paribus laws and ‘open’ questions of the kind considered
here are typical. For example, when observing the inverse correlation between the
pressure and volume of a gas in a high school physics experiment on Boyle’s Law,
the student must pay particular attention to the ceteris paribus clause ‘in conditions
of constant temperature’. To ask the question ‘What about the temperature?’ is to
remove the restriction to constant temperature, and calls for further experiments
to discover the resulting, more complicated, dependencies.
A second theme to the research reported here is that of reasoning about agents
with non-transitive preferences. Intransitive preferences have been considered in
the foundations of rational choice theory, most notable by Anand in [1], who argues
for an alternative to the standard account in which intransitive preferences are
permitted. His view remains controversial as a normative account but there is
little doubt that transitivity of preference is simply false as a descriptive account
of preference. We showed that the ‘local’ rationality of decisions based on ceteris
paribus preference is compatible with a lack of transitivity, and gave two detailed
examples of how this can lead to strange results. We also characterised transitivity
of preference in terms of invariance under changes in the order in which questions
are asked, including a version of Condorcet’s notorious voting paradox.
One ﬁnal connection to be made is between our approach to the dynamics of com-
plex questions and research on belief revision. Removing a complex ceteris paribus
condition, so allowing it to vary, shares properties with the operation of ‘contracting’
a belief set with a complex belief. Both are essentially non-deterministic, for similar
reasons. Further research is needed to chart out the details of this comparison.
14An alternative approach would be to focus on the changing awareness of the agent making decisions as
a result of obtaining answers to her questions. Existing work on logics of awareness include [5], [8], [4] and
[10]. As far as we are aware, there is no direct technical relationship between these approaches and ours.
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